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[“Naïve and sentimental character: Schiller’s Poetic Phenomenology.”  Aesthetic Reason and  
Imaginative Freedom: Friedrich Schiller and Philosophy.  Edited by María del Rosario Acosta 
López and Jeffrey Powell.  Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2018.  Pages 101-121.] 
 
Suchst du das Höchste, das Größte?  
Die Pflanze kann es dich lehren. 
Was sie Willenlos ist,  
sey du es wollend – das ists!1   
 
 
 
Poets are, by definition, “the preservers of nature,” but when they can no longer 
completely be so, they serve as its witnesses” and “avengers.”   In the former case, they 
are natural; in the latter, they seek the lost nature. In the former case, they imitate what is 
actual; in the latter, they portray something ideal.  Every poet is accordingly “either naïve 
or sentimental.”  Even in the present day, Schiller insists, “nature is the only flame that 
nourishes the poetic spirit,” a spirit that gathers all its power from nature and speaks to it 
alone even in the case of “artificial” human beings, caught in the grip of culture (NSD, 
196/432, 200f/436f).2   In this way Schiller distinguishes between two basic kinds of 
poetry and poetic genius grounded in different relationships to nature.3  Indeed, the 
development in Schiller’s thinking from the Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man to 
On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry is marked by the way that nature replaces reason as the 
center of gravity.4   Each form of poetry possesses a distinctive and constitutive moral 
dimension that is sustained by their respective relationships to nature. 
The distinction between naïve and sentimental poetry is easily misunderstood.  
Schiller is by no means claiming that a poet is always and necessarily only naïve or 
	
sentimental.  The exclusive disjunction “either naïve or sentimental” stands, but only for 
a given poem or part of one.  Thus, although he mainly treats the two forms as parallel 
with ancient and modern poetry respectively, Schiller reminds his readers that the 
distinction is not a matter of time, but “manner” (Manier).5 Just as there is no lack of 
sentimental tropes in some ancient poetry, particularly in Latin, naïve poetry can be 
found in every class of modern poetry.  Similarly, while both Homer and Shakespeare are 
naïve poets, the two forms of poetry are both on display in Goethe’s Werther’s Suffering.  
Yet the two species fall under a common genus, namely a “poetic spirit” that, in 
drawing its nourishment solely from nature, is equivalent to being human (NSD, 
200/436).  The concept of poetry itself is nothing but the concept of giving humanity its 
most complete possible expression, whether it be in a condition of natural simplicity 
where all human powers are acting harmoniously in nature or in a cultural condition 
where such a harmony is nothing more than an idea.  The two forms of poetry correspond 
to these two conditions and so it is that the paths of poetry and the paths of humanity 
coincide, as do the two forms of poetry and the two sorts of human being (NSD, 
201f/437ff, 233/473f, 241/482).  Schiller accordingly speaks of both a naïve “character” 
and a sentimental one (NSD, 214/452, 221/459, 249f/491f).  His reflections on naïve and 
sentimental poetry are thus at once poetic reflections on human character, on the 
dominant ways of being that constitute the human condition. 
Yet while Schiller is intent on differentiating between the two characters of 
humanity and forms of poetry, according each its due and registering its respective 
advantages over the other, he does not simply present them as divergent characters, 
standing side-by-side one another.  His reflections on naïve and sentimental characters is 
a reflection on what it means to be truly human, i.e., what it means to be human in the 
full sense of the term, which is not simply a matter of exhibiting a character that is 
sometimes naïve and other times sentimental.   To the contrary, he outlines a fundamental 
and essential dynamic between the two characters.  To the extent that the true nature of 
humanity can be realized, it requires moving beyond the naïve experience of nature and 
naturalness to the sentimental experience of nature.  In other words, while Schiller 
attempts to establish the integrity of the two distinct species, he also privileges one over 
the other.   
	
The pursuit of these two objectives gives rise to a deep tension in his reflections 
on poetry and humanity.  A primary aim of the following paper is to examine this tension 
and its importance for his poetic reflections on human nature.6  To that end this paper 
mainly reviews, in the first two sections, analyses of naïve and sentimental species of 
poetry as well as the dynamic between them.   A secondary aim of the paper (pursued in a 
brief, concluding section) is to flag note how those analyses, anticipating central themes 
and moves of phenomenology, at once exemplify and supersede a poetic phenomenology 
of the human condition.    
 
1.  Nature over Art: the Moral Pleasure of Naïve Poetry  
There are moments in life when we find ourselves cherishing the nature of a certain 
object, standing in awe of it, simply because it is natural, a part of nature.  Two 
conditions are necessary for this feeling: the object must be part of nature or what we take 
to be nature, and, second, it must be naïve, “i.e., nature must contrast with art and put it to 
shame” (NSD, 180/413). Schiller uses the term “art” in a broad but traditional sense, 
reminiscent of Aristotle’s distinction between the natural and the artificial, the former 
having its principles of rest and motion internal to it, the latter external to it.  Thus, “art” 
here designates the artificial in general, including every cultural phenomenon produced 
by human deliberation and execution.  In Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of 
Man, art stands for the freedom of the aesthetic. By contrast, here it stands for the 
alienating culture, alienated from nature, dubiously set free from nature by reason and 
human device.  The natural, when viewed in contrast to art so conceived, is naïve.  The 
naïve is accordingly unaffected, devoid of any semblance of artificiality; it is unforced 
precisely because it involves no exertion, no design, and no work against what comes 
naturally.7   
Nature is not automatically naïve; it becomes naïve when it is contrasted with the 
artificial surfaces.  Nature, so considered, is the freedom that something enjoys when it 
obtains itself, existing according to its own laws, i.e. is one with itself.   Hence, Schiller 
adds, the pleasure that we take in the naïve is not aesthetic but moral; that is to say, it is 
not generated by observation alone but is mediated by an idea.  What pleases us is not the 
beauty of a form but an idea exhibited by certain objects.  “It is not these objects, it is an 
	
idea portrayed by them, that we cherish in them” (NSD, 180/414).  So, too, while the 
naïve poet imitates nature, it is not actual or ordinary nature but genuine nature instead 
(though no naïve poet, Schiller allows, has flawlessly pulled this off (NSD, 236ff/476-
79).   
 Given this analysis of what basically motivates our attraction to naïve phenomena, 
Schiller moves, without skipping a step, from objects in nature that are considered naïve 
to human behaviors displaying that same naïvete, and then to the poetic depictions and 
evocations of these naïve phenomena in general, i.e., to naïve poetry.  Certain objects in 
nature and certain human behaviors are considered naïve on the basis of a particular way 
of experiencing them, namely, an experience of them mediated and motivated by the idea 
of a contrast with the artificial.  The themes of naïve poetry are these naïve phenomena. 
In order to write such poetry, i.e., in order to be a naïve poet, one must obviously have 
the corresponding feelings and experiences.  Something similar holds for the ability to 
appreciate such poems.    
With this gloss of the general significance of the naïve in hand, Schiller 
introduces his basic distinction regarding poetry and poets.  There are, at the base, two 
kinds of poets: those who are natural and those who seek to be.  As noted at the outset of 
this paper, the former, “the guardians of nature,” are naïve poets; the latter, “nature’s 
witnesses and avengers,” are sentimental poets (NSD, 196/432, 200/436).8  The sort of 
poet one is depends upon the character of the age in which one lives or on the impact of 
contingent circumstances upon the poet.  Thus, Greek poetry is paradigmatically but by 
no means unfailingly naïve, while modern poetry is typically, but not invariably 
sentimental (NSD, 197/433, 203n/437n).  Yet whether it is history or circumstances that 
determines the kind of poet, what they determine in either case is the poet’s relationship 
to nature.  If the poet is one with nature, simply safeguarding it, her poetry is naïve; if the 
poet feels the loss of nature and, thus, the need to bear witness to it, even to avenge it, her 
poetry is sentimental.  Where the poet’s expression of her own sentiments, self-
expression, is missing in naïve poetry, it is the hallmark of sentimental poetry. 
While Schiller applies the adjective “naïve” to a broad palette of phenomena 
(objects, behaviors, experiences, poems, poets), what they have in common is their 
naturalness and the moral pleasure produced by that naturalness.  Yet the experience of 
	
this pleasure is complex because its emergence depends upon awareness of its opposite, 
i.e., the contrast with art and artificiality.   The tenuousness of this dependence is patent 
since it means that we have to go beyond mere observation of something in order to 
consider and enjoy its naïve character.  In other words, we have to reflect on the 
phenomenon, comparing it to its mirror image, in order to appreciate its unreflective 
character.   
 The basic significance of the naïve for Schiller is, as noted, the experience of 
nature in contrast with the artificial.  The experience is itself pleasurable but it is a “moral 
pleasure.”  There are two sorts of naïveté and, accordingly, two forms of poetry that 
produce this moral pleasure.  Behavior that is unexpected and thus, as a rule, laughable is 
deemed “naïve” (“the naïveté of surprise”), but so is behavior that simply displays a 
wholesome disregard of convention and culture (“the naïveté of character”).9   An 
example of the former has already been given, i.e., the actions and expressions of 
children.  However, as noted earlier, the example holds only to the extent that we indulge 
the illusion that they could be artificial and act otherwise.  Strictly speaking, only those 
who are capable of acting otherwise (acting artificially) can display the childlike, 
unintended behavior that takes the form of being surprising.  Thus, for example, public 
displays of such behavior in situations that are embarrassing (if not for the person 
responsible for the behavior then for others) typically produce a combination of mirth, 
respect, and melancholy. 10   While we laugh at the surprising (i.e., unmannerly, 
unconventional, improper, indecorous, etc.) behavior, we also admire it for its naturalness 
and freedom from conceit, even as we also poignantly note our own lack of that freedom 
(NSD, 185/420).11  
While nature commands our attention in this case, the person behaving so is in the 
other species of naïve subject matter, the naïve temperament.   We not only experience a 
moral pleasure, but we experience it regarding a moral object, and while nature is in the 
right in both cases, it is nature in the form of a person’s honorableness in the latter case.  
The expression of nature here is not simply a spontaneity that amuses because it ridicules 
social convention; it is instead the sort of deliberate action that wins our respect for the 
agent.  So while the common theme remains the same, i.e., the contrast of nature with art 
that puts the latter to shame, the notion of nature is not the same in each sort of naïveté .   
	
Schiller gives three examples of the naïveté of character: the action of a child 
who, upon hearing that someone is perishing from poverty, immediately gives her 
father’s wallet to the poor man; an honest, trusting person’s act of sharing a confidence 
with another who is bent on betraying that trust; and Pope Adrian VI’s frank and public 
admission to the Church’s adversaries of its misdeeds (though the respect for the 
admission diminishes – think of a politician’s tears – to the extent that it appears to be 
more a matter of prudence than candor). In all three cases, the action puts the state of the 
actual world to shame, the world of human creation, as the nature of the individuals in 
each case follows “its moral constitution” (NSD, 185/420). 12  As evidenced by this last 
remark, the conception of nature at work in Schiller’s account is the source of a moral 
character that overrides anything artificial or cultural, at least aesthetically, and any 
human institution not in keeping with it. 
 In the immediate wake of presenting these examples of a naïve temperament and 
thinking (Denkart), Schiller makes the claim that every true genius is naïve.  The claim is 
unsurprising in certain respects, given the tradition of thinking about genius that traces 
back to Kant.  Genius is nature’s way of providing rules for art, almost behind the backs 
of the geniuses themselves.  A genius has no clue to how she comes upon the ideas of 
what to produce; she has no control over them and no capacity to convey them in the 
form of directions (from which Kant infers that genius is to be found only in fine arts and 
not in science).13  
Schiller expands on this Kantian account by addressing the “naïve grace” with 
which a genius expresses her thoughts.  This genius for naïve expression supposedly 
flows at once freely and by inner necessity from the naïve type of thinking.  The 
“ingenuity” and “esprit” of the poetic genius’ writing style consists in making its subject 
matter fully alive and transparent, presumably rendering all commentary superfluous, as 
“the sign completely disappears in what is signified.”  Thus, in the naïve expression, 
words, thoughts, and reality are in perfect alignment; the words of poetic genius (“divine 
decrees from the mouth of a child”) render what is thought fully present, even if for the 
first and only time.  This naïveté of expression stands in stark contrast to affected, 
inauthentic ways of speaking in everyday social life, where “people often say something 
other than they are thinking” (NSD, 190f/425f).  If the words inspired by poetic genius 
	
disappear in what is said naïvely, so, too, does the naïve poet: “The naïve poet is the work 
and the work is the naïve poet” (NSD, 197/433).  
Schiller augments Kant’s gloss on genius by extending it to the genius’ 
intellectual and moral character and even to the genius’ gender.14  Significantly if also 
somewhat ambiguously, he contends that genius, acting not on principles but on “insights 
and feelings,” expands nature itself.  At a first reading, this contention may seem at odds 
with Kant’s view that genius is nature’s way of giving rules to art. How can it make sense 
on this view that genius “expands” nature?  However, it bears recalling that even in 
Kant’s view, genius consists in each case in an originality, i.e., in the supposition of 
nature’s fecundity for art.  Second, it must be remembered that genius, precisely in its  
naïveté not only portrays what is natural, but is itself natural.  Thus, the naïve genius is 
part of or even better an active participant in nature’s fecundity.   
From these observations, it follows that the naïveté of genius requires an 
understanding of nature as superseding itself, that is to say, superseding what it, at any 
point, affords or presents itself as.  So, too, the experience of the naïve is never an 
experience of nature simply or as something simply given.  In other words, the naïveté of 
nature is not natural, at least not in the sense of an unmediated nature, a point to which I 
return below.15  
 Schiller reinforces this general point by adding a developmental aspect to the 
naïve experience, an aspect that is nostalgic in one direction and obligatory in another.  
Referring to naïve objects, he writes: “They are what we were; they are what we should 
become again.”  Thus, small children provide us with a pure impression of the naïve, as 
long as we ignore the fact that they are incapable of being artificial and contrast them 
with ourselves.  So construed, they are “holy objects,” exhibiting an “integrity” of which 
we can only dream.  Identifying the naïve with “a childlikeness where it is not expected,” 
Schiller notes how naïve phenomena remind us of “our lost childhood” and thereby 
introduce a certain melancholy.  At the same time, they exhibit “our highest perfection in 
the ideal” and, hence, stir sublime feelings in us.  Culture’s task, he adds, is to lead us 
back, “along the path of reason and freedom,” to nature (NSD, 180f/414f).16     
 
2.  Nature Superseding itself through Art: the Moral Longing of Sentimental Poetry  
	
The foregoing accounts of the species of naïveté , together with the naïveté characteristic 
of genius fill out the picture of the distinctive conception of nature supposed and 
portrayed by naïve poetry.  The nature that we find in naïve phenomena is morally 
pleasing because it represents possibilities of honest self-expression not beholden to 
convention, making our nature clear to ourselves and others.  Yet it does so 
paradoxically, as noted above, given its dependence upon a conception of a dissembling, 
cultural conventionality.   
As Schiller segues into his discussion of sentimental poetry, he makes this 
conception of naïve nature explicit by elaborating two sorts of longing for nature.  He 
challenges his readers to consider what they long for when, fed up with social 
affectedness and cultural conventions, they pine for nature.  The nostalgia that we feel 
when, for example, we experience a child’s naïveté can make us long for the happiness or 
perfection of nature.  The former sort of longing is motivated by sensory desires, the 
latter only by moral aspirations.  While it is clear that Schiller associates nature in naïve 
poetry with the longing motivated by moral aspirations, he also makes clear the necessity 
of refusing to identify with it.  Indeed, it is necessary to forgo the happiness that comes 
from nature alone in order to pursue its perfection or the lost completeness of it.  As 
Schiller puts it, while only a sensual individual complains about the loss of purely natural 
happiness, “only a moral individual can mourn the loss of nature’s completeness.”  
Indeed, together with that loss, submitting to all the evils of culture is, he states “the 
natural condition of all that is good.”17  Hence, he concludes with the conditional 
admonition, “if you can take consolation in the loss of natural happiness, then let its 
completeness serve as the model of your heart” (NSD, 192f/428). 
When Schiller turns to sentimental poetry, the two different sorts of longing for 
nature, i.e., for natural happiness and for natural completeness, give rise to different 
senses of ‘nature,’ i.e., a crude, unrefined nature and a refined, but pure nature.  While the 
latter alone is the theme of both naïve and sentimental poetry, it can only be expressed 
sentimentally, that is ideally once culture and art have laid their hands on the human 
being (NSD, 200f/436f).  Since Schiller countenances naïve poetry in modernity, he 
presumably means that it can be expressed only in times when we are in the grip of 
culture and art.  In such circumstances, our unnaturalness is the catalyst for our urge for 
	
simplicity, for finding outside us in nature what is no longer in us.  Hence the moral 
nostalgia we feel for our lost childhood.  Sometimes Schiller speaks of culture, the culprit 
in this regard, without qualification; other times he is referring to modern culture, such as 
when he contrasts his contemporaries with the Greeks.  What comes naturally for the 
Greeks, we have to objectify and transform into an idea.  Thus, Schiller observes, “they 
felt naturally, while we feel the natural.”  The edifice of their social life was erected on 
“feelings,” not “on some clumsy work of art,” and “culture had not degenerated to such a 
degree that nature was left behind in the process” (NSD, 195f/430f).   
Schiller makes clear, as already noted, that the gloss of the difference between 
ancient and modern poetry merely registers tendencies (a respective “spirit”) since forms 
of naïve and sentimental poetry can be found in every era and even in a single poet.  
Nevertheless, registering these tendencies in such historical terms is not insignificant 
since we can no more return to the ancient world than deny its legacy.  Naïve poetry and 
sentimental poetry represent the beginning and the end of this transition respectively, the 
passage from an actual oneness with nature to a moral, ideal unity with it.  Moreover, as 
also noted above, he regards this poetic transition as indispensable to human development 
and maturation.  Thus, in a key passage, after remarking that ancient poets touch us 
through their sensuous truth and modern poets through ideas, he observes: “This road 
taken by the modern poets is…the same road humans in general must travel, both as 
individuals and as a whole.  Nature makes a human being one with himself, art separates 
and divides him; by means of the ideal he returns to the unity” (NSD, 202/438).   
On the basis of this observation, Schiller claims a certain priority for sentimental 
poetry, precisely because its self-conscious character, i.e., the consciousness of its lack of 
naturalness entails infinite horizons.  The claim is somewhat paradoxical for two reasons: 
first, the model of the nature sought is the nature portrayed by naïve poetry, i.e., the 
nature that puts art to shame; and, second, the sentimental consciousness of being 
unnatural is itself natural, inherent to human nature, albeit dominant in a certain stripe of 
human personality.  Moreover, the sentimental poet’s material must be naïve in certain 
respects.  Thus, in the course of defending a poet’s liberties, Schiller argues that their 
naïveté justifies them.  As long as the material is “naïve and combines the mind and the 
	
heart, it is … worthy of acclaim, regardless of all the objections of a frigid sense of 
decency” (NSD, 224f/463f). 
It would be wrong to infer that the superior poetry here seeks to be what the other 
species of poetry is already.  After all, the very consciousness that constitutes naïve 
poetry presupposes the consciousness of the contrast between nature and art; hence, there 
is a sentimentality at the heart of any experience of the naïve.   Thus to access to the pre-
reflective character of experience, the naïve, there is no other recourse than reflection, 
i.e., sentimental poetry.18   
Schiller allows that in a certain, undeniable way, a cultured human being can 
never be as complete as someone who is so naturally. Nevertheless, “the goal for which 
the human being strives through culture is infinitely superior to the goal that he attains 
through nature.”  Hence, if, as noted above, culture is the culprit when it comes to the 
loss of a simple, unaffected naturalness, it is also the means to something more, the 
endless progression toward “an infinite greatness” (NSD, 202/438).   Since culture and 
art are as natural to human nature as human reason is (indeed, they are expressions of it), 
sentimental poetry is, in effect, nature’s way of exceeding itself (or “superseding itself,” 
as we put it in the case of genius).   
This cultural detour to the natural ideal reveals itself in the sentimental poet’s 
need to move beyond merely depicting nature outside her to expressing her nature, her 
own feelings and reflections or, even better, her reflected feelings.  Thus, while the naïve 
poet simply follows her natural feelings in imitating reality, the sentimental poet “reflects 
on the impression the objects make on her and only on the basis of the reflection is the 
emotion founded, into which she is transported and into which she transports us.” The 
sentimental poet is thus forced to negotiate mixed feelings that spring from two 
conflicting sources, “the actual world as a limit and her idea as something infinite” (NSD, 
204/441).  The themes of sentimental poetry are always mediated by the poet’s need to 
reflect on and express her feelings.  “This mentality can endure no impression without at 
the same time looking to the play of its own mind and, by reflection, setting up outside 
itself and opposite itself what it has in itself.” This happens, Schiller adds, even when the 
sentimental poet wants to show us his own feelings (NSD, 214f/452f).19   
	
Based upon this confrontation of the limited actual world and the infinite idea in 
the mind of the sentimental poet, Schiller identifies three manners of feeling that are 
operative: the satire, the idyll, and the elegy respectively.20  A feeling of the contradictory 
relation between actuality and the idea informs satire, a sense of their agreement 
dominates in the idyll, and the alternation between the pain of contradiction and the joy 
of agreement animates the elegy.  Since all sentimental feelings fall under this threefold 
disjunction, these three types completely delineate the field of sentimental poetry.21  
Satire belabors the actual world’s deficiencies in comparison with the ideal (“the 
supreme reality”). “Censuring” (also dubbed “pathetic”) and “mocking” (also dubbed 
“amusing”) satires express an aversion to the actual world in serious and humorous 
manners respectively.  Works of Juvenal and Swift epitomize pathetic satire, while 
Horace, Cervantes, and Fielding are masters of amusing satire.22   The indignation 
expressed by pathetic satire and the sarcasm expressed by amusing satires must both arise 
from an ideal.  That is to say, whatever form the satire takes, it must take its bearings 
from the ideal or “it will have no poetic effect at all.” What Schiller understands by the 
poetic effect is precisely the awakening of the ideal in the mind of the reader.23    
The communication of the ideal is also the defining feature of the elegy. An elegy 
is a lamentation, but it is poetry only if the sadness expressed springs from a conception 
of the ideal.  Sadness over losses can serve as material for elegy only if what is lamented 
can also be represented as an “object of moral harmony” (NSD, 212/450).24  Schiller 
lauds “our Klopstock” – “the musical poet” – as the indisputable master of the elegiac 
genre, though his praise also includes choice remarks about the poet’s and genre’s 
limitations (NSD, 217-20/455-58). 
The idyll portrays human beings in a state of innocence, “in harmony and at peace 
with himself and his surroundings.” Both peoples and individuals have their paradises; 
they recall their respective state of innocence, their respective golden age, and this 
recollection informs the pastoral idyll.  Indeed, Schiller considers Milton’s Paradise Lost 
as “the most beautiful idyll in the sentimental genre.”  Though the usual setting for the 
idyll is pastoral, a place before the onset of culture, the harmonious existence portrayed 
by the idyll is in fact culture’s final goal.  The idyll provides tangible confirmation of the 
	
plausibility of the idea of this harmony.  Nevertheless, Schiller makes a point of its 
limitations, given its focus on a place before the onset of culture.   
Unfortunately, they [idylls] place behind us the goal toward which they 
are supposed to lead us.  Thus they can inspire in us only the sad feeling of 
a loss, not the joyous feeling of hope….They can only heal the sick mind, 
they cannot nourish the healthy one. They cannot motivate, they can only 
soothe. (NSD, 227-31/466-71). 
 
None of the arts of poetry, Schiller adds, have been able to make up for this defect 
rooted in the essence of the pastoral idyll. 
Schiller concludes his treatment of the two forms of poetry with a comparison of 
their respective perils and limitations.  Just as the naïve poet always runs the risk of 
imitating vulgar reality or actual nature instead of genuine nature, so the sentimental poet 
runs the risk of overidealizing her subject matter.  The naïve poet’s sensibility, her naïve 
feelings, can fail to remain “sufficiently exalted,” while sentimental poet’s spontaneity 
can fail to remain “sufficiently restrained.”  As a result, while triviality (triteness) and 
vulgarity are constant temptations for the naïve poet, the sentimental poet must contend 
with the temptations of exaggeration and fantasy (NSD, 236-44/474-86).  Analogously, 
just as the recreation (alternatively, the recovery or convalescence: Erholung) provided 
by naïve poetry is too often related one-sidedly to the real needs of sensuous life, so, too, 
the ennoblement prompted by sentimental poetry is frequently defined one-sidedly in 
terms of ideas alone.25  As this last comparison suggests, neither the naïve nor the 
sentimental character can completely capture “the ideal of beautiful humanity, an ideal 
that can only emerge from the union of both” (NSD, 249/491). 
 
3.  Schiller’s Poetic Phenomenology  
The task of poetry in Schiller’s eyes is, as iterated and illustrated on the preceding pages, 
to give full expression to human nature.  With this thought in mind, he analyzes naïve and 
sentimental species of poetry in terms of two fundamental, but mutually exclusive types 
of human feelings.  For purely logical reasons, i.e., based upon some straightforward, 
exclusive disjunctions, he considers his analysis, both of the basic structures of these two 
species and their subdivisions, to be complete.  Naïve poetry moves us by capturing 
feelings of “nature, individuality, and a vivid sensuality,” while sentimental poetry does 
	
so through the medium of “ideas and a lofty spirituality” (NSD, 220/459).  Whereas naïve 
poetry produces a feeling of restful motion, sentimental poetry creates one of restless 
motion (NSD, 233/474).  Yet only the union of these two feelings yields, as noted, “the 
ideal of beautiful humanity,” but the yield – always a matter of approximation – is found 
only in a poetic mood (Stimmung).26   
The aim of the first two sections of this paper has been to provide brief 
clarification of these analyses and their conclusions.  The aim of the following 
concluding section is to flag how these analyses anticipate problems and moves of 
twentieth century phenomenology.  To put the matter anachronistically but aptly, this 
final section demonstrates key ways in which Schiller’s essay on naïve and sentimental 
poetry provides a paradigm for a poetic phenomenology.27 
  The status of nature within naïve and sentimental feelings is a bit of a paradox.  
The naturalness of these feelings is negatively determined; that is to say, what makes 
them natural is what they are not, i.e., not artificial, not contrived, not affected, non-
conformist, etc.  In the case of naïve feelings, the naturalness is simply registered 
(imitated); in the case of sentimental feelings, it is felt as something both lost and longed 
for.  Hence, in an important sense, both naïve and sentimental phenomena derive their 
meanings from the modes of experience that they supposedly exclude.  Yet it is 
sentimental poetry that inherently aspires to a nature that is more than what is presently 
given to us; it is culture’s (art’s) means of signaling nature as something lying beyond it.  
Culture exploits naïve phenomena for moral purposes or, better, as a way of articulating 
those purposes.  To the extent that sentimental poetry longs for and sets up a certain 
naturalness as an ideal, it also must contend with this reliance upon a conception that is 
principally, if not wholly, determined negatively.28  
 The paradox of naturalness supposed by naïve and sentimental poetry is related to 
the ironic difference between the ancient and the modern experience of nature.  As 
Schiller points out, one finds little sentimentality in ancient poetry, least of all for nature 
as the modern world conceives of it.  Thus, ancient poetry focuses pre-eminently on 
objects, treating them all without distinction, whether natural or artificial.  While we 
moderns are enthralled by nature’s “serene necessity,” the Greeks are innocently 
personifying it at every turn, “ascribing to the will influence where a blind necessity 
	
reigns.”  In this way, they overcome the very aspect of nature that is its singular attraction 
for us.  What is ironic, in other words, is the fact that, while the Greeks surpass us in 
everything that is natural, we alone revere nature as such, i.e., the naïveté of nature, 
nature in contrast to art (NSD, 193ff/429ff).   
The reason for this reverence, Schiller submits, lies in our unnaturalness when 
contrasted with the Greeks.  Since the Greeks had not lost nature in their humanity, they 
had no need to rediscover it outside them nor were they surprised to find nature outside 
them.  “They felt naturally, while we feel the natural” (NSD, 195/431).  This irony (the 
fact that the Greeks did not experience the naïve because their experiences were naïve) 
points to the paradoxical character of the two species of poetry and the experiences 
underlying them.  Both naïve poetry and sentimental poetry derive from and are 
motivated by a sense of nature heightened by the experience of unnaturalness.29   
One might argue, however, that there is not so much paradox and irony as there is 
a poetic sleight of hand (an allusion) or even an illusion at work in Schiller’s account.  
How can nature – or, alternatively, being natural or authentic – be the aim of human 
striving if the naïve experience of nature or, even better, the experience of nature as 
something naïve, is not the way that we experience nature?  How can we strive for what 
we do not know, or know at best through the nostalgia for a bygone time, i.e., our 
childhood?  Or if we do know it, how can we establish that it is given to us and thus 
avoid the inference that it is our product?  How can we avoid concluding that the naïve is 
artificial, an artifice, a sentimental invention?   
The constellation of issues underlying such questions corresponds to some basic 
issues for phenomenology.  One such issue is that of the objective or given status of any 
phenomenon or experience, i.e., the pretension of specifying it without the artful and 
historical trappings of a subjectivity that would distort it.  To be sure, there is no 
phenomenon at all that does not have some subject to which it appears the way that it 
does.  Providing an objective account of phenomena requires negotiating the perspective, 
designs, and concepts that the subject brings with it to the experience.  Husserl’s 
phenomenology attempts to return to the matters themselves by bracketing 
presuppositions in an effort to describe the givenness of things.  But such negotiating and 
bracketing, difficult in any case, is acute when it comes to the sort of phenomena that 
	
Schiller deems naïve.  Given that the hallmark of the naïve is the contrast with the 
artificial, one might well ask whether the naïve can be given at all.30 
Since “naïve” designates what is natural precisely in contrast to what is mediated 
by reflection, it may be said to designate immediate experience.  “Reflection” is a word 
that Schiller uses to gloss the sentimental; particularly given some common uses of 
“sentimental,” some critics prefer to employ “reflective” over “sentimental” to 
characterize this species of poetry and experience.31  “Reflection” is also the term that 
Husserl uses to designate the phenomenologist’s only recourse to recovering immediate, 
“naïve” experiences.32  The issue for the phenomenologist, then, is how reflecting on 
experience can yield the essence of the unreflected experience.  In this respect, Schiller’s 
reflections on naïve and sentimental poetry are analogous, on one level, to 
phenomenological reflections on pre-reflective experience.33 On another level, given the 
issues that have been raised in the last few paragraphs, they exemplify a sort of 
irreducible differentiation, the determination of which, exceeding both sides of their 
difference, must be constantly deferred.34  Moreover, on both these levels, Schiller’s 
poetic phenomenology enjoys the considerable advantage of availing itself of the 
phenomenological work already done by the poets. 
Yet the experience of the naïve is not simply theoretical.  It is, above all, 
pleasurable and, indeed, a “moral pleasure,” as Schiller characterizes it.  This 
characterization brings it closer to existential questions of being authentic (Heidegger) 
and acting in good faith (Sartre).  The pleasure in question is, as already noted, precisely 
the sort that we take in displays of naturalness and, not least, in ways of acting that 
contrast with the artificial, purely conventional, or calculating sorts of behavior.  The 
supposition here is that there is a kind of integrity to nature and that culture, including art, 
represents a rupture, a break with naturalness.  The unity with itself that Schiller 
attributes to nature as the subject of naïve poetry and the aspiration of sentimental poetry 
represents nothing less than the existential ideal of authenticity.    
Flagging these phenomenological cognates to Schiller’s interpretation provides 
some contemporary context for evaluating his interpretation and its potential significance.  
His endeavor to give a viable interpretation of these phenomena coincides with basic 
philosophical questions about achieving objectivity, accessing our experiences, and being 
	
authentic, not least in deferring the differentiation of objectivity or authenticity and their 
opposites.  However, there is more to Schiller’s endeavor – more promise – than a mere 
historical coincidence.  Without by any means resolving these questions, Schiller’s 
reflections suggest a neglected and fertile way of addressing them, namely through 
poetry.  Taking poetry as a means of disclosing what is essential in human experience, 
Schiller’s poetic phenomenology, i.e., his reflections on the basic species of poetry, 
succeeds in articulating something essential to being human. 
In Ideas I Husserl makes the striking claim “that ‘fiction’ makes up the vital 
element of phenomenology,” a claim that corresponds to his conception of phantasy as a 
form of “neutrality modification,” i.e., the sort of “neutralization” (bracketing and 
suspending) necessary to attend to consciousness itself.35  In the neutralization of the 
natural attitude, the contents of what is given in that attitude, far from being lost or 
forfeited, take center stage as the phenomenologist retains and reflects upon them, in an 
attempt to discern their essential nature.  In a similar way, the neutralization is the work 
of both naïve and sentimental poetry, and it remains for the poetic phenomenologist to 
reflect on their contents, attempting to discern the essential character and structure of 
human feelings.  Despite his ardent defense of the process of reflection, Husserl was 
deeply aware that the process is fraught,36 just as Derrida was aware that we have to 
make do merely with traces (and simultaneously erased traces at that) of the difference 
between the unreflected (the naïve) and the reflected (the sentimental).37   
Schiller’s poetic phenomenology underscores that this difference is – for most of 
us at least – the permanent tension at the core of being human, a tension that must be 
constantly revisited since the reconciliation of naïveté and sentimentality can only be an 
ideal. 38   Yet, in a way that is perhaps true to his account if at odds with its 
phenomenological character, Schiller cannot leave us with this reference to the ideal 
alone.  To be sure, he refuses to say whether a class of people exists in a setting that 
allows them to combine the naïve and the sentimental characters in such a way that 
avoids the excesses of both, thereby realizing the ideal.  He iterates his contention that it 
is futile to try to resolve the conflict between the realistic and idealistic feelings that 
underlie naïve and sentimental poetry respectively.  Yet, in the course of the argument, he 
observes that the conflict will hardly be resolved “other than in a few, rare individuals, 
	
who hopefully there always have been and always will be” (NSD, 248-50/490-92).  
While reaffirming the results of his poetic phenomenology in one sense (after all, the 
tension still characterizes the human condition), the observation also moves squarely 
beyond a strictly phenomenological investigation.  Yet perhaps this move demonstrates 
that phenomenology, even a poetic phenomenology, for all its resources, also has its 
naïve and sentimental limitations, limitations that only reality – and no ideal – can 
overcome.  
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nature unspoiled or the ideal fulfilled perfectly,” the contrast with the actual world will 
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appears so clearly to be an historical construct? 
31 See “The Reflective Poet” in William Witte, Schiller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), 
53-68; also Mainland’s introductory remarks to Schiller, Über naïve und sentimentalische 
Dichtung, edited with Introduction and annotation by William F. Mainland (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1957), xxvii-xxviii. 
32 Edmund Husserl, Ideas I, trans. Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2014), 
67f, 91, 139f.  
33  Ibid., 226f, 241, 291f; Jean-Paul Sartre, L’être et le néant: Essai d’ontologie 
phénoménologique (Paris: Gallimard, 1943), 16-22. 
34 The reference here is obviously to the notion of différance; see Jacques Derrida, 
Marges de la philosophie (Paris: Les editions de minuit, 1972), 1-29. 
35 Husserl, Ideas I, 127, 147, 213-16. 
36 Ibid., 146-52, 173.  
	
																																																																																																																																																																					
37 Derrida, Marges, 25f: “La <<trace matinale>> de la différence s’est perdue dans une 
invisibilité sans retour et pourtant sa perte même est abritée, gardée, regardée, retardée.  
Dans une texte.  Sous la forme de la présence.  De la propriété.  Qui n’est elle-même 
qu’un effet d’écriture.” 
38 The inherent need to revisit this tension is reminiscent of Heidegger’s talk of being free 
for the possibility of taking back previous decisions, and his identification of this freedom 
with the authentic resoluteness to repeat itself; see Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit 
(Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1972),	308.	
